Investigation
The 764 Network: Inside the Online Sextortion Ring Targeting Children
The 764 network is a decentralized international online sextortion ring that coerces children as young as 9 into producing sexual abuse material, filming acts of self-harm, and even committing violence โ all for status within the group. The FBI considers it a Tier One investigative matter, its highest priority designation. Canada has classified it as a terrorist organization.
Published May 26, 2026 ยท Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, House Oversight Committee, Fox News
350+
Active FBI investigations
Source: FBI, Dec 2025
8+
Countries with arrests
Source: DOJ
Ages 9โ17
Targeted victim age range
Source: FBI
12+
Named defendants charged
Source: DOJ indictments
Tier One
FBI investigative priority
Source: FBI, Dec 2025
What the 764 Network Is
The 764 network โ named after an area code in its early Discord channels โ is a decentralized international criminal network classified by the U.S. government as a Nihilistic Violent Extremist (NVE) group. Unlike traditional criminal organizations with rigid hierarchies, 764 operates as a loosely connected web of individuals united by a shared ideology of nihilistic violence and the exploitation of children.
The network was founded around 2021 by Bradley Chance Cadenhead (alias "Felix"), a Texas teenager who built the group into an international operation. In December 2025, Cadenhead pleaded guilty in San Antonio federal court to RICO conspiracy and child exploitation charges โ marking one of the first RICO cases ever brought against an online child exploitation network.
764 exists within a broader ecosystem known as "The Com"(short for "The Community"), a loose online collective of thousands of individuals involved in sextortion, child sexual abuse material (CSAM) distribution, swatting, doxxing, and other cybercrime. The Com spans multiple platforms and sub-groups, with 764 being one of its most violent and organized offshoots.
In 2024, Canada formally designated 764 as a terrorist organization, making it one of the first online child exploitation networks to receive that classification by any government.
How They Operate
The 764 network's operations are designed to exploit, control, and traumatize children. Their methods are systematic and deliberately cruel, driven by a status system where the most extreme abuse earns the highest standing within the group.
๐ฏ Identification & Initial Contact
Members identify potential victims on mainstream platforms โ Discord, Roblox, Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat. They look for children who appear lonely, depressed, questioning their identity, or struggling socially. Initial contact is friendly and supportive, often through gaming communities or social media comments.
๐ค Building Trust & Isolation
Groomers present themselves as understanding friends or romantic interests. They validate the child's feelings, offer emotional support, and gradually isolate them from family and friends. Conversations move from public platforms to private channels on Discord or Telegram where monitoring is minimal.
๐ธ Coercion & Exploitation
Once trust is established, members pressure or trick children into sending compromising images or videos. This initial material becomes leverage. Victims are told their images will be sent to parents, friends, or posted publicly unless they comply with escalating demands โ producing more explicit CSAM, filming acts of self-harm, or committing violence.
๐ CSAM as Currency
Within 764, child sexual abuse material functions as a form of currency and status. Members trade CSAM, compete to produce the most extreme content, and use coerced material as proof of their standing. Footage of children harming themselves โ cutting, burning, carving words into their skin โ is particularly valued for the control it demonstrates over victims.
๐ Platform Migration
764 members are skilled at evading detection. When a Discord server is shut down, they reconvene on Telegram. When accounts are banned, they create new ones within hours. They use encrypted messaging, VPNs, and rotating aliases to stay ahead of law enforcement and platform moderation teams.
Platforms Used by 764
764 operators exploit a wide range of mainstream platforms, each serving a different purpose in their operation.
Source: FBI, DOJ indictments, House Oversight Committee testimony
How They Target Children
764 members deliberately seek out the most vulnerable young people online. According to FBI testimony and DOJ indictments, the network specifically targets:
- โขChildren aged 9โ17, with a concentration on ages 10โ14 โ old enough to have unsupervised internet access but young enough to be manipulated
- โขLGBTQ+ and gender-questioning youth who may feel isolated from peers and family, making them more receptive to online "acceptance"
- โขChildren with depression, anxiety, or self-harm tendencies โ groomers weaponize existing mental health struggles
- โขSocially isolated children who spend significant time in online communities and may lack strong offline support networks
- โขNeurodivergent youth who may have difficulty recognizing manipulative social dynamics
Source: FBI testimony to House Oversight Committee, Feb 2026; DOJ indictments
The Grooming Playbook: Step by Step
Based on federal indictments and FBI case analysis, here is the typical progression of a 764 grooming operation:
- 1
Scout
Members browse gaming platforms (Roblox, Minecraft), social media (Instagram, TikTok), and Discord servers popular with teens. They look for signs of vulnerability โ posts about loneliness, depression, family conflict, or identity struggles.
- 2
Friend
Initial contact is casual and friendly. They compliment the child, express shared interests, offer to play games together, or provide emotional support. This phase can last days or weeks.
- 3
Migrate
The groomer moves the conversation to a less monitored platform โ typically Discord DMs, Telegram, or Snapchat. This is framed as wanting to "talk more privately" or share things they "can't share on here."
- 4
Isolate
The child is encouraged to keep the relationship secret. The groomer undermines trust in parents and friends: "They wouldn't understand us." The child becomes emotionally dependent on the groomer.
- 5
Normalize
Sexual content is gradually introduced โ sharing pornography, making sexual jokes, asking increasingly personal questions. The boundary between normal and exploitative is deliberately blurred.
- 6
Extract
The child is pressured, tricked, or dared into sending a compromising image or video. Sometimes this involves fake romantic relationships; other times it involves deceit (like impersonating another teen).
- 7
Blackmail
Once initial material is obtained, the tone shifts immediately. The child is told: "Send more or I'll share this with your parents/school/everyone." Demands escalate โ more explicit material, acts of self-harm filmed on camera, violence.
- 8
Exploit
The coerced material is shared within the 764 network as currency. Victims may be passed between multiple abusers. Some victims are coerced for months or years, trapped in escalating cycles of abuse.
Source: DOJ indictments (Varagiannis/Nepal, Cadenhead); FBI Congressional testimony
The FBI Response
The FBI has elevated the 764 network and related online child exploitation groups to its highest investigative priority. As of December 2025, the Bureau has:
- โขOpened 350+ investigations into 764-linked subjects across the United States
- โขClassified 764 as a Tier One investigative matter โ the same designation given to terrorism and counterintelligence threats
- โขCoordinated arrests in at least 8 countries through international law enforcement partnerships
- โขConnected 764 investigations to the broader Operation Relentless Justice initiative targeting online child exploitation networks
In February 2026, the House Oversight Committee launched a formal investigation into 764 and the broader "Com" ecosystem, calling FBI officials and platform representatives to testify about the scope of the threat and the failures that allowed these networks to operate on mainstream platforms for years.
Source: FBI testimony, House Oversight Committee, Dec 2025 / Feb 2026
Known Prosecutions
Federal prosecutors have brought significant cases against key 764 figures, including some of the first-ever RICO charges for an online child exploitation network.
Bradley Chance Cadenhead ("Felix") โ Founder
Texas ยท Convicted May 2023 ยท Sentenced to 80 years
Cadenhead, a Texas teenager, founded the 764 network around 2021. He was convicted in May 2023 and sentenced to 80 years in Texas state prison on child pornography charges. His appeal was denied in February 2026. He also pleaded guilty in December 2025 in San Antonio federal court to RICO conspiracy and child exploitation charges โ one of the first RICO cases ever brought against an online child exploitation network.
Source: Court records; Tampa Free Press; DOJ press release, Dec 2025
Richard Anthony Reyna Densmore
Age 47, Kaleva, MI ยท Army veteran ยท Sentenced Nov 7, 2024 ยท 30 years federal prison
Densmore pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 years in federal prison for sexual exploitation of a child. An Army veteran, he created 764's online networks that were used to coerce children into producing sexual abuse material. His case was prosecuted in the Western District of Michigan.
Source: DOJ โ W.D. Michigan, Nov 2024
Leonidas Varagiannis ("War") & Prasan Nepal ("Trippy") โ "764 Inferno" Co-Leaders
Varagiannis: Age 21, U.S. citizen in Greece ยท Arrested Apr 29, 2025 ยท Nepal: Age 20, High Point, NC ยท Arrested Apr 22, 2025 ยท Both face life
Varagiannis and Nepal co-led the "764 Inferno" subgroup. Varagiannis was arrested in Greece; Nepal was arrested in North Carolina. Both were charged with operating an international child exploitation enterprise, coordinating the sextortion and coercion of multiple minor victims across countries, and directing other 764 members to target specific children. They face life in prison.
Baron Cain Martin ("Convict") โ 764 Leader
Age 21, Tucson, AZ ยท Arrested Dec 11, 2024 ยท 29-count superseding indictment
Martin faces a 29-count superseding indictment including child exploitation enterprise, conspiring to provide material support to terrorists, producing child pornography (5 counts), distributing child pornography (11 counts), coercing minors (3 counts), cyberstalking (3 counts), and animal crushing. His case represents one of the most extensive indictments against a 764 member.
Tony Christopher Long ("Inactive")
Age 19, Porterville, CA ยท Indicted on 6 counts ยท In state custody
Long was indicted on 6 counts including animal crushing, sexual exploitation of a minor, and cyberstalking. He is currently in state custody.
Source: DOJ โ 764 Member Charged, 2024
Angel Almeida
Age 23, Brooklyn, NY ยท Pleaded guilty ยท Early FBI 764 investigation
Almeida, a 764 associate, was originally arrested on firearms charges before being charged with possession of child exploitation material in 2023. He pleaded guilty and was set for sentencing in March 2024. His case was one of the earliest FBI investigations into the 764 network.
Source: WIRED; DOJ
"Greggy's Cult" โ 764 Precursor Group (5 Defendants)
Charged Dec 2025 ยท DOJ Eastern District of New York
Five men were charged in December 2025 for running "Greggy's Cult," a precursor group to 764 that operated from January 2020 to January 2021. The group used Discord and gaming platforms to find child victims, coercing them into producing CSAM and holding live exploitation events on Discord. All five were charged with child exploitation enterprise, producing child pornography, and interstate threats.
- Camden Rodriguez, 22, Longmont, CO
- Rumaldo Valdez, 22, Honolulu, HI (former Navy sailor)
- Zachary Dosch, 26, Albuquerque, NM
- David Brilhante, 28, San Diego, CA
- Hector Bermudez, 29, New York, NY
Source: DOJ EDNY indictment, Dec 2025
What Platforms Failed to Do
764 operated openly on major platforms for years. While no platform can prevent all misuse, the scale and duration of 764's activities point to systemic failures in content moderation, user safety, and law enforcement cooperation.
Discord
764 used Discord as its primary coordination platform for years. Private servers hosting CSAM, voice channels used for real-time coercion, and recruitment channels operated with minimal disruption. While Discord has increased Trust & Safety staffing and NCMEC reporting in recent years, the platform's private server architecture made it an ideal haven for groups like 764.
Roblox
With 40+ million daily active users under age 13, Roblox was a prime hunting ground. 764 members entered children's games to initiate contact. Roblox's in-game chat system, limited parental controls, and weak age verification made it easy to approach young children without oversight.
Instagram & TikTok
Both platforms' recommendation algorithms surfaced children's profiles to adult strangers. DM features allowed unsolicited contact from unknown adults to minors. Despite announced safety features, enforcement remained inconsistent and reactive rather than proactive.
Snapchat
Snapchat's disappearing messages gave children a false sense of security, making them more likely to send compromising images. 764 members exploited this by screenshotting or screen-recording content before it disappeared.
Telegram
Telegram served as a fallback coordination and distribution platform. Its encrypted channels, minimal content moderation, and resistance to law enforcement requests made it the ideal backup when Discord servers were shut down.
Source: House Oversight Committee testimony, Feb 2026; DOJ indictments; FBI
How to Protect Your Child
Understanding the threat is the first step. Here are concrete actions parents can take to reduce their child's risk:
Know What They're Using
Regularly review the apps on your child's devices. Pay special attention to Discord, Telegram, Snapchat, and any messaging app you don't recognize. Children often have accounts parents don't know about.
Talk About Sextortion Directly
Children need to know that sextortion exists and that it happens to real kids. Explain that anyone online can lie about who they are, and that sending intimate images โ even to someone they trust โ can be used against them. Make clear that if it happens, they will not be in trouble for telling you.
Watch for Warning Signs
Sudden secrecy about online activity, new "friends" they won't talk about, unexplained emotional distress, withdrawal from family, self-harm, or receiving gifts/money from unknown sources are all red flags that a child may be in contact with a predator.
Enable Privacy Settings
Set all social media accounts to private. Disable direct messages from strangers on every platform. Enable parental controls and screen time limits. On Discord, disable DMs from server members. On Roblox, restrict chat and contact settings.
Create a Safety Plan
Tell your child: "If anyone online ever threatens you, asks for photos, or makes you uncomfortable, come to me immediately. You will never be in trouble. We will handle it together." Repeat this regularly. Victims stay silent because they fear punishment โ remove that fear.
Reporting Resources
If you believe a child is being exploited or is in danger, report immediately:
NCMEC CyberTipline
Report online child exploitation at report.cybertip.org or call 1-800-843-5678. This is the national clearinghouse for reporting CSAM and child exploitation. Reports are forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)
File a complaint at ic3.gov. For immediate threats, contact your local FBI field office directly.
Local Law Enforcement
If a child is in immediate danger, call 911. For non-emergency reports, contact your local police department's Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task force.
Crisis Support
988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline: Call or text 988. Crisis Text Line: Text HELLO to 741741.